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Muslim Profiles Post 9/11
Bernard E. Harcourt

ABSTRACT
Racial profiling as a defensive counterterrorism measure necessarily implicates a
rights trade-off: if effective, racial profiling limits the right of young Muslim men to be
free from discrimination in order to promote the security and well-being of others.
Proponents of racial profiling argue that it is based on simple statistical fact and
represents “just smart law enforcement.” Opponents of racial profiling, like New York
City police commissioner Raymond Kelly, say that it is dangerous and “just nuts.”
As a theoretical matter, both sides are partly right. Racial profiling in the context
of counterterrorism measures may increase the detection of terrorist attacks in the short
term, but create the possibility of dangerous substitutions in the long run. Defensive
counterterrorism measures are notoriously tricky and can easily backfire. The installation
of metal detectors in airports in 1973, for instance, produced a dramatic reduction in the
number of airplane hijackings, but also resulted in a proportionally larger increase in
bombings, assassinations, and hostage-taking incidents. Target hardening of U.S.
embassies and missions abroad produced a transitory reduction in attacks on those sites,
but an increase in assassinations. The evidence shows that some defensive
counterterrorism measures do not work and others increase the likelihood of terrorist acts.
As a practical matter, then, both sides are essentially wrong: racial profiling is
neither “just” smart, nor “just” nuts. The truth is, we simply have no idea whether racial
profiling would be an effective counterterrorism measure or would lead instead to more
terrorist attacks. There is absolutely no empirical evidence on its effectiveness, nor any
solid theoretical reason why it would be effective overall. As a result, there is no good
reason to make the rights trade-off implicated by a policy of racial profiling in the
counterterrorism context.
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Muslim Profiles Post 9/11
Bernard E. Harcourt 1
INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the London bombings in July 2005, Paul Sperry of the Hoover
Institution, a well-respected public policy institute at Stanford University, defended the
police profiling of young Muslim men in New York City subways as a matter of simple
common sense. Writing in the pages of the New York Times, Sperry argued that any
future terrorist offender is likely to be young, male, and Muslim: “Young Muslim men
bombed the London tube, and young Muslim men attacked New York with planes in
2001. From everything we know about the terrorists who may be taking aim at our
transportation system, they are most likely to be young Muslim men.” It makes no sense,
Sperry contends, to search old ladies or children. Instead, the police should target the
high-risk population. Profiling, Sperry writes, is “based on statistics. Insurance
companies profile policyholders based on probability of risk. That's just smart business.
Likewise, profiling passengers based on proven security risk is just smart law
enforcement.” 2 A similar column appeared in the Washington Post the next day, arguing
that “politically correct screenings won’t catch Jihadists:” “It is a simple statistical fact.
Yes, you have your shoe-bomber, a mixed-race Muslim convert, who would not fit the
profile. But the overwhelming odds are that the guy bent on blowing up your train traces
his origins to the Islamic belt stretching from Mauritania to Indonesia.” Using random
bag searches in the New York subways, the column concludes, “is simply nuts.” 3

1

Professor of Law, University of Chicago. Special thanks for excellent research assistance to Zac Callen
and Ellen Fitzgerald.
2
Paul Sperry, “When the Profile Fits the Crime,” New York Times, July 28, 2005 (available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/28/opinion/28sperry.html).
3
Charles Krauthammer, “Give Grandma A Pass,” Washington Post, page A23, July 29, 2005 (available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/28/AR2005072801786.html).
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New York City police commissioner Raymond Kelly couldn’t disagree more.
“Look at the 9/11 hijackers,” Kelly exclaims. “They came here. They shaved. They went
to topless bars. They wanted to blend in. They wanted to look like they were part of the
American dream. These are not dumb people. Could a terrorist dress up as a Hasidic Jew
and walk into the subway, and not be profiled? Yes. I think profiling is just nuts.” 4 Racial
profiling is, in Kelly’s words, “ineffective” because it assumes that terrorists are not
going to adapt to changing circumstances, and, as a result, puts the police one step behind
the enemy. Racial profiling focuses on an “unstable” trait—a trait that can easily be
switched—which, as Malcolm Gladwell explains, is precisely “what the jihads seemed to
have done in London, when they switched to East Africans because the scrutiny of young
Arab and Pakistani men grew too intense.” 5 Plus, Kelly adds, in New York City it’s
simply impracticable. “If you look at the London bombings, you have three British
citizens of Pakistani descent. You have Germaine Lindsay [the fourth London suicide
bomber], who is Jamaican. You have the next crew [in London], on July 21st, who are
East African. You have a Chechen woman in Moscow in early 2004 who blows herself
up in the subway station. So whom do you profile? Look at New York City. Forty per
cent of New Yorkers are born outside the country. Look at the diversity here. Who am I
supposed to profile?” 6
So, is racial profiling post 9/11 “just smart law enforcement” or is it “just nuts”?
Moreover, does profiling young Muslim men violate the principle of non-discrimination
embedded in international human rights and domestic civil rights jurisprudence?
These two questions, I argue, are inextricably linked, and the answer to the first
resolves the second: there is no reliable empirical evidence that racial profiling is an
effective counterterrorism measure and no solid theoretical reason why it would be. The
possibility of recruiting outside the profiled group and of substituting different modes of
attack renders racial profiling in the counterterrorism context suspect.

4

Malcolm Gladwell, “Troublemakers: What pit bulls can teach us about profiling,” The New Yorker,
February 6, 2006 (available at http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/060206fa_fact) (quoting
NYPD Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly).
5
Id.
6
Id.
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The fact is, defensive counterterrorism measures are notoriously tricky. The
spotty empirical evidence tends to show a strong potential for substitution effects. The
installation of metal detectors in airports in 1973, for instance, produced a dramatic
reduction in the number and rate of airplane hijackings across the globe, 7 but also
resulted in a sharp and proportionally larger increase in bombings, assassinations, and
hostage-taking incidents. 8 Target hardening of U.S. embassies and missions abroad
produced a transitory reduction in attacks on those sites, but an increase in
assassinations. 9 Retaliatory strikes produce a spike in short-term terrorist attacks that
later level off to the earlier mean. 10 In addition, anecdotal evidence suggests that suicide
bombers in Israel tended to be young militant Muslim men at first, but now include more
secular Palestinians, women and teenage girls. 11 A recent and thorough review of the
empirical literature, using an approved Campbell Collaboration protocol, 12 concludes that
“some evaluated [defensive counterterrorism] interventions either didn’t work or
sometimes increased the likelihood of terrorism and terrorism-related harm.” 13 In sum,
counterterrorism measures are potentially double-edged swords.
There is no empirical evidence whatsoever, nor a solid theoretical reason why
racial profiling would be an effective measure—rather than a counterproductive step
resulting in detrimental substitutions and increased terrorist attacks. As a result, racial
profiling is neither “just” smart law enforcement, nor “just” nuts. It’s an unknown

7

William M. Landes, “An Economic Study of U.S. Aircraft Hijacking, 1961—1976,” Journal of Law and
Economics, 21(1): 1—31 (April 1978).
8
Jon Cauley and Eric I. Im, “Intervention Policy Analysis of Skyjackings and Other Terrorist Incidents,”
American Economic Review 78:27—31 (1988); Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, “The Effectiveness of
Antiterrorism Policies: A Vector-Autoregression-Intervention Analysis,” American Political Science
Review 87(4): 829—844 (December 1993).
9
Enders and Sandler 1993: 842; see also Cauley and Im 1988: 30.
10
Enders and Sandler 1993: 835.
11
Jonathan B. Tucker, “Strategies for Countering Terrorism: Lessons from the Israeli Experience” (March
2003) (available at the U.S. Homeland Security Department Institute web site at
http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/Articles/tucker-israel.html).
12
The Campbell Collaboration is a non-profit organization that promotes evidence-based policy making by
supporting empirical evaluations of the existing empirical literature in different policy arenas, including
crime and security through its Crime and Justice Coordinating Group. The study in question here—Lum,
Kennedy, and Sherley 2006: 5—had its review protocol approved by the Crime and Justice Coordinating
Group. For information about the Campbell Collaboration, see
http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/index.asp
13
Cynthia Lum, Leslie W. Kennedy, and Alison J. Sherley, “The Effectiveness of Counter-Terrorism
Strategies: A Campbell Systematic Review,” working paper dated January 2006, at page 3.
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quantity. And precisely for that reason, there is no justification for making the human
rights and civil rights trade-offs associated with racial profiling.

Thorny Questions
Those potential trade-offs would raise a myriad of thorny issues. The first is
whether the very use of race, color, nationality or ethnic identity is a form of
impermissible discrimination in a situation where there is solid evidence of disparate
offending between racial or ethnic groups. A number of economists in the United States
and Great Britain draw a distinction between what they term “statistical discrimination”
and racial bigotry: the first uses group traits to promote more efficient policing and
extends only to the point where law enforcement has maximized the efficiency of their
interventions—as evidenced, for instance, in the equalizing of search success rates
between members of different racial groups. 14 At that point, these economists suggest,
law enforcement has achieved the best allocation of resources in a non-discriminatory
manner. It is only when law enforcement uses group traits beyond the point of efficiency
that their use of race or ethnicity becomes invidious. Economist Vani Borooah suggests,
for instance, in his article Racial Bias in Police Stops and Searches: An Economic
Analysis, that “statistical discrimination [business necessity], untainted by bigotry, is
optimal from a policing perspective because it maximizes the number of arrests
consequent upon a given number of persons stopped.” 15 In other words, the very
definition of racial profiling is a hotly contested issue. 16
14

For a detailed treatment of this, see Bernard E. Harcourt, “Rethinking Racial Profiling: A Critique of the
Economics, Civil Liberties, and Constitutional Literature, and of Criminal Profiling More Generally,” 71
The University of Chicago Law Review 1275 (2004).
15
Vani K. Borooah, Racial Bias in Police Stops and Searches: An Economic Analysis, 17 Eur J Pol Econ
17, 19 (2001). For a fruitful discussion of the difference between statistical discrimination and naked
bigotry, compare Vani K. Borooah, Economic Analysis of Police Stops and Searches: A Reply, 18 Eur J Pol
Econ 607 (2002), with Shanti P. Chakravarty, Economic Analysis of Police Stops and Searches: A Critique,
18 Eur J Pol Econ 597 (2002). In the United States, the leading works in the area include John Knowles,
Nicola Persico, and Petra Todd, Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence, 109 J Pol
Econ 203 (2001); Rubén Hernández-Murillo and John Knowles, Racial Profiling or Racist Policing?:
Testing in Aggregated Data (working paper Apr 18, 2003), online at
http://www.econ.upenn.edu/~jknowles/Research/HKRacProf_2003c.pdf (visited July 27, 2004); Nicola
Persico, Racial Profiling, Fairness, and Effectiveness of Policing, 92 Am Econ Rev 1472 (2002); Charles
Manski, “Search Profiling with Partial Knowledge of Deterrence,” unpublished paper (2005); Jeff Dominitz
and John Knowles, “Crime Minimization and Racial Bias: What Can We Learn From Police Search Data?”
PIER Working Paper 05-019 (February 18, 2005) (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=719981).
16
See generally Harcourt, Rethinking Racial Profiling at 1276 n.2.
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A second definitional controversy involves the judicial distinction between, on the
one hand, the use of race or ethnic origin as part of a multi-pronged profile and, on the
other hand, the use of race exclusively as the sole factor in a profile. In the United States,
for instance, the Supreme Court drew precisely this legal distinction in its notorious
decision Whren v. United States 17 in 1996—as well as in several earlier decisions
involving U.S. Border Patrol searches at the Mexican-American border in the mid1970s. 18 The Court in Whren expressly condoned the use of race as one factor among
others, as long as there exist other independent justifications for police intervention—in
that case, youth, demeanor, and gender were also important traits in the profile. The result
is that, in American jurisprudence today, there is an operative distinction between using
race exclusively and using race as one among other factors: the first is unanimously
condemned, the second is practically always permitted. 19 In international law as well
there is ambiguity surrounding the distinction. The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, for instance, provides that in times of public emergency, states may
derogate certain rights on condition that the measures “do not involve discrimination
solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.” 20 Here too,
the reference is to the exclusive use of race, not to the use of race as one among other
factors.
Assuming that the use of race automatically violates the principle of nondiscrimination, a third thorny issue arises: is the nondiscrimination principle absolute or
can it be limited in the case of counterterrorism? This has both philosophical and legal
doctrinal dimensions. At the philosophical level, the question is whether violations of
rights in the present can be excused in order to prevent future rights violations—
especially where those future rights violations are assumed to be more harmful in the
aggregate. A significant body of literature explores the question of intergenerational
rights transfers and would be applicable here: John Rawls’ discussion of “the problem of
17

517 US 806 (1996).
18 See Bernard E. Harcourt, “United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and United States v. Martinez-Fuerte: The
Road to Racial Profiling,” in Carol Steiker, ed., Criminal Procedure Stories (Foundations Press 2006).
19
See R. Richard Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal Protection Doctrine and
Discourse, 48 UCLA L Rev 1075, 1086–87 n 47 (2001) (“The consensus view seems to be that race may
be considered as one of many factors, but may not be the only factor in an officer’s decision to stop an
individual.”). For a lengthy treatment of this, see Harcourt, Rethinking Racial Profiling at 1338—1342.
20
ICCPR, Article 4 (emphasis added).
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justice between generations,” 21 as well as Joel Feinberg’s discussion of the rights of
unborn generations, 22 chart out some avenues of analysis and offer guidance. Another
body of literature addresses shorter-term trade-offs. The leading hypothetical here is
whether torture may be permitted in the extreme case of the ticking time-bomb 23 —but
there are many others, some less hypothetical than others. The use of the atomic bomb at
Hiroshima comes to mind. Many remarkable philosophical texts address these puzzles of
moral reasoning under a variety of different rubrics, ranging from Jean-Paul Sartre’s and
Michael Walzer’s discussion of “dirty hands” to Martha Nussbaum’s writings on “tragic
predicaments.” 24
At the legal doctrinal level, there are human rights and domestic civil rights issues
to contend with as well. In the international context, the main question is whether the
right to be free from discrimination is derogable. In their thorough paper on
counterterrorism measures and human rights compliance, 25 Alex Conte and Boaz Ganor
set forth in detail the doctrinal structure for an analysis of this question, marshalling the
principle human rights texts that address racial discrimination and profiling—including
recent reports on racial profiling and counterterrorism from the United Nations
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) and the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights. 26 The CERD has repeatedly maintained that
counterterrorism measures may not discriminate on the grounds of race or national or
ethnic origin. For their part, Conte and Ganor point to disagreement within the human

21

John Rawls, “The Problem of Justice between Generations,” 284—293, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1971).
22
Joel Feinberg, “The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations,” in Philosophy and Environmental
Crisis, ed. William Blackstone (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1974).
23
Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule offer a useful review of the landscape here in discussing the moral
limits on coercive interrogation in their article Should Coercive Interrogation Be Legal?, 104 Michigan
Law Review 671, 676—682 (February 2006).
24
See generally Jean-Paul Sartre, Les Mains sales (Paris: Gallimard 1948); Michael Walzer, “Political
Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 2(2): 160—180 (1973); Martha
Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (Cambrdige,
UK: Cambridge University Press 1986)(especially chapters 2 and 3).
25
Alex Conte and Boaz Ganor, “Legal and Policy Issues in Establishing an International Framework for
Human Rights Compliance When Countering Terrorism,” ICT Paper available at
http://www.ict.org.il/pdf/Ganor_Conte_Nov05.pdf (2005).
26
See Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, “Statement on Racial Discrimination and
Measures to Combat Terrorism,” in Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
and Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, both
discussed in Conte and Ganor 2005: 37—38.
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rights community and conclude that the principle of non-discrimination is indeed a
derogable right.
Finally, in the civil rights context, there are difficult questions. Under equal
protection jurisprudence in the United States, for instance, the anti-discrimination
principle is only violated if there is intentional discrimination with proven malice. The
Supreme Court’s decisions in McCleskey v Kemp 27 and United States v Armstrong 28 —
which extend the Washington v Davis 29 requirement of intent to the criminal justice
sphere—provide that a successful equal protection challenge must rest on evidence of
intentional discrimination, rather than on inference from unexplained disparate treatment.
If the police are engaging in statistical discrimination to promote police efficiency, it is
not clear whether individuous intent would be present. Moreover, the intentional use of
race may be permitted if there is a compelling governmental interest. Fighting
terrorism—actually reducing the incidence of terrorist acts—would undoubtedly qualify
as a compelling state interest. 30 The key question, for purposes of equal protection, then,
is whether the use of race in profiling would be narrowly tailored to serve this interest,
given that the intentional use of race as a factor in policing would trigger strict scrutiny. 31
The requirement of narrow tailoring would preclude policing techniques that are
ineffective, or that have unacceptable collateral consequences on the profiled population;
but that determination, naturally, would fall on the courts.

No Need for a Trade-Off
These are all admittedly fascinating questions that deserve our attention. But they
only arise if racial profiling is an effective defensive counterterrorism measure. And on
that score, there is no reliable evidence, nor a good theoretical reason to believe that
27 481 US 279 (1987). In McClesky, the Court rejected an Equal Protection claim for lack of a showing of
actual discriminatory intent, where petitioner produced evidence that murderers of white victims are 4.3
times more likely to be sentenced to death than murderers of African-American victims. Id at 287, 291–99.
28 517 US 456 (1996). In Armstrong, the Court required evidence of discriminatory purpose in the context
of a selective prosecution challenge. Id at 465.
29 426 US 229 (1976). In Davis, the Court articulated the principle that the Equal Protection Clause bars
only intentional discrimination. Id at 239–41.
30 Though some question this conclusion, I have no doubt that post–Grutter v Bollinger, 539 US 306
(2003), which deemed promoting a diverse student body a compelling state interest, see id at 332–33,
fighting crime most probably would as well. See generally Harcourt, Rethinking Racial Profiling at 1349—
1350.
31 See, for example, Gratz v Bollinger, 539 US 244, 268–75 (2003) (applying strict scrutiny to a University
of Michigan admissions policy favoring minority applicants).
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profiling would be effective. As an empirical matter, we do not know whether the
profiling of young Muslim men in New York City, London, Paris, or other major cities
would reduce the incidence of domestic acts of international terrorism or cause more and
different attacks.
Profiling is a statistical method that draws, methodologically, on an actuarial
approach first developed in the insurance industry. But unlike early insurance
applications, which were relatively static,32 profiling in the policing context involves a
dynamic form of prediction: the profiling itself alters the behaviors of those persons who
are both profiled and not profiled. As a result, the success of profiling will depend on two
factors: first, in terms of detecting and preventing terrorist acts, it will depend on
identifying a stable group trait that correlates with higher offending—or at least a group
trait that is stable enough to serve as a predictive factor during the next period of
profiling. And second, in terms of deterring and preventing terrorist acts, it will depend
on how responsive different groups are to the targeted policing and whether they engage
in forms of substitution. Both of these turn on what we call the comparative elasticity to
policing of the two groups—in other words, on how responsive the different groups are to
increased police surveillance. Taking a long-term view, profiling will only succeed if
young, male, Muslims are more or equally responsive to the increased risk of detection
associated with police profiling than the non-profiled group members, and thus are not
able to recruit non-profiled persons, nor substitute with more harmful terrorist acts.
The effectiveness of profiling thus turns on the relative elasticity of the different
groups—the profiled group of young, male, Muslims on the one hand, and the nonprofiled groups of other persons who might be recruited to commit the terrorist acts in the
face of profiling. But on this central question, we have absolutely no reliable data. As an
empirical matter, we do not know whether profiling will work in the counterterrorism
context or on the contrary cause more terrorist attacks. As a result, there is no need to
address the difficult trade-offs that are presented by human rights conventions and civil
rights laws intended to eliminate racial discrimination. The important point here, though,
32

It is fair to say that this is changing in the insurance area, and that the field is becoming increasingly
dynamic insofar as actuarial prediction is becoming more and more individualized, to the point where the
determination of individual insurance premiums will increasingly affect individual behavior. This wasn’t
true of early insurance practices.
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is that the issue turns on an empirical and theoretical analysis of the effectiveness of
racial profiling, not on a legal or doctrinal review of human rights or civil rights law.

In this paper, I evaluate the empirical case for racial profiling. I explore both the
short-term and long-term implications. Surprisingly, although international terrorism is
by no means a new phenomenon, there is extremely little reliable empirical research on
the effectiveness of defensive counterterrorist measures, and there is no reliable empirical
research whatsoever on the use of racial profiling. I argue that this is problematic
because, like any other police method, there is a strong potential that a defensive policing
technique may backfire—that the use of profiling will actually increase rather than
decrease the long-term incidence of the targeted offense. This potential arises from a
phenomenon called “substitution”—from the possibility that, in response to profiling,
terrorist organizations will either (1) recruit more individuals from non-profiled groups,
thereby expanding the overall pool of potential terrorists, or (2) substitute different types
of terrorist attacks that are more immune to profiling and yet more devastating in terms of
deaths and injuries. And it raises a host of technical empirical questions that are at present
entirely unresolved.
Before proceeding, though, it is important to identify precisely the type of
measure in question. Broadly speaking, there are two types of counterterrorist
initiatives. 33 The first are called defensive or deterrence-based counterterrorist policies.
These are policies that aim to prevent or block the success of a terrorist attack and reduce
the likelihood that an attack will cause injuries. This type of defensive policy includes the
development and deployment of technology-based measures, such as metal or explosives
detectors at airports and the hardening of potential targets like embassies and foreign
missions. In contrast, proactive or preemptive policies aim to dismantle terrorist
organizations by means of infiltration, preemptive strikes, or invasion of supportive
states. Profiling can be used in either case. The profiling of young Muslim men in the
New York City subways exemplifies the former—a defensive counterterrorism measure.
But profiling can also be used in preemptive or proactive strategies, as when, for

33

See generally, Enders and Sandler 1993: 829-44; João Ricardo Faria, “Terrorist Innovations and AntiTerrorist Policies,” Terrorism and Political Violence 18: 47-56 (2006); Tucker 2003.
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example, the F.B.I. engages in targeted interviews of Muslim and Arab Americans in
order to collect intelligence. 34 In this paper, I address only racial profiling by the police in
defensive counterterrorism operations.

EVALUATING THE EMPIRICAL CASE FOR RACIAL PROFILING

I.

Profiling and Immediate Detection
As a theoretical matter, there is no doubt whatsoever that the probability of

detecting a terrorist attack increases in the immediate aftermath of the implementation of
a criminal profiling method. This is simply an inexorable product of the laws of
probability: if the police dedicate more resources to investigating and searching members
of a higher-offending group, they will inevitably increase the detection of terrorist
activities within the profiled group and in society as a whole in the immediate aftermath.
This reflects, theoretically speaking, an iron law of probabilities—and it is
precisely what gives rise to the claim, among proponents of profiling, that it is “based on
statistics” 35 and that “It is a simple statistical fact.” 36 These claims are correct in the
narrow time period following the implementation of a profiling method. The basic
intuition is that policing is like sampling in the social sciences: when law enforcement
agencies profile members of a higher-offending group, they are essentially sampling
more from that higher-offending group. As such, they will detect more offenders with the
same resources because, by necessity, those searches are more likely to detect offending.
Thus, profiling on a group trait that correlates with higher offending will
necessarily increase the likelihood of detection in the very first iteration. This will have
significant benefits along at least two dimensions: first, in preventing the specific terrorist
act that is detected, and second, in incapacitating the apprehended terrorist from
committing any future acts of terrorism.
As a practical matter—and still within the context of the immediate aftermath of
implementing a profiling measure—the likelihood of realizing any tangible benefits from
34

Mary Beth Sheridan, “Interviews of Muslims to Broaden: FBI Hopes to Avert a Terrorist Attack,”
Washington Post, July 17, 2004, at p. A1.
35
Sperry 2005.
36
Krauthammer 2005.
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racial profiling will depend entirely on the frequency of the profiled event. The higher the
frequency of the event, the more likely that profiling will immediately detect more of
those events. A good illustration is mandatory screening at airports—an initiative that, to
be sure, does not involve profiling, but does involve increased sampling. Implemented in
1973, mandatory screening in the United States detected 4,783 firearms and 46,318
knives in 1975, and, according to the FAA, prevented approximately 35 potential
hijackers that year. To put that number in perspective, that same year there were 6
domestic hijackings in the U.S. 37
Low base-rate events, however, are far more difficult to predict, 38 and as a result
much harder to detect for several reasons. First, it is extremely hard to predict where,
when, or how the low base-rate offense will occur. Second, low frequency affords more
time to adjust to any counterterrorism measure. A terrorist attack in the New York City
subway qualifies as a low base-rate event—fortunately, there have not been any such
attacks—but as a result, there is a lot of time between events and opportunity for a
terrorist organization to adjust to the profiling. In the case of low frequency events, the
central question is whether the increased likelihood of detection associated with the
immediate implementation of a profiling measure will result in the actual detection of
planned terrorist activity or instead in the rapid substitution of persons who do not meet
the profile or alternative acts that are not as easily profiled.

II.

Long-term Effects on the Frequency and Extent of Terrorist Attacks
Immediate detection is extremely important, especially to the potential victims

and their families, friends, and communities who would suffer the greatest harm. Those
potential benefits cannot be minimized. But they need to be considered in light of the
long-term effects on terrorist attacks and the likelihood of future deaths, injuries, and
destruction. The central question here is whether racial profiling is likely to prevent
future terrorist acts.

37

Landes 1978: 24 (n.41) and 3 (Table 1).
Albert Rosen, “Detection of Suicidal Patients: An Example of Some Limitations of the Prediction of
Infrequent Events,” Journal of Consulting Psychology, 18: 397—403 (1954).

38
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An Economic Model of Profiling

A number of able economists have turned their attention to racial profiling and
argue that the use of profiling may amount to more efficient policing. They contend that
profiling on a group trait associated with higher offending rates—what they call
“statistical discrimination”—may in fact be the most efficient way to allocate police
resources. Drawing on Gary Becker’s groundbreaking work on tastes for
discrimination, 39 a group of U.S. economists— notably John Knowles, Nicola Persico,
and Petra Todd at the University of Pennsylvania, and Jeff Dominitz at Carnegie Mellon
University—have developed economic models of racial profiling. Similar analyses are
taking place in Great Britain. 40 Although these economic models are being developed in
the specific context of racial profiling on highways and city streets, the models apply
equally to profiling as a defensive counterterrorist measure.
The logic of the racial profiling models rests on the central assumption of the
economic theory of crime, namely that any rational individual is less likely to engage in
an activity if the cost of the activity increases. This is what is called, in more technical
jargon, the “elasticity of offending to policing”—or “elasticity” for short. The elasticity
of offending to policing is the degree to which changes in policing affect changes in
offending. Assuming that potential offenders respond rationally to the probability of
detection and punishment, then targeting law enforcement on members of a higheroffending population will not only increase the amount of crime detected, but more
importantly decrease the offending rate among those members of the targeted group
because of the increased cost. In its purest form, the economic model of crime suggests
that law enforcement should target higher-offending populations until the point where
their offending rates have fallen to the same level as the general population. At that point,
the government maximizes the effectiveness of its law enforcement resources.
I have set forth in great detail the logic of these economic models both in the
broad context of criminal profiling in my book Against Prediction, 41 and in the specific
39
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context of racial profiling on the highways in my article Rethinking Racial Profiling, 42
and I refer the technical reader to those more elaborate treatments. For present purposes, I
offer a more streamlined description of the analysis and modify the models to address the
specific context of counterterrorism profiling.
The central assumption, of course, is that there are two different groups with
different offending rates. The profiled group consists of young Muslim men, which, for
purposes of the agent on the street translates into young men of apparent Arab descent,
young men who look Middle-Eastern, South-East Asian, North African or African, or,
more generally, young men of color (excluding young men from East Asia). The nonprofiled group consists of all women, older men, and young white or East Asian men.
As a factual matter, this first assumption is probably correct, at least in the United
States. Of the total population in the U.S., there are extremely few persons of European,
American, African-American or East Asian descent who have or are seemingly prepared
to engage in suicide bombing or similar mass terrorist acts against Americans. Richard
Reid, the “shoe bomber,” who was traveling to the United States on a British passport,
and Jose Padilla, a Hispanic-American arrested at Chicago’s O’Hare airport and accused
of plotting a terrorist attack, are the two people who immediately come to mind—out of a
population of about 200 million (excluding children, the elderly, and young men of
color). In contrast, the number of young men of Arab descent who have engaged in
terrorist activities on American soil is larger and includes the nineteen men who
participated in the 9/11 terrorist attacks, as well as those who engaged in the earlier car
bombing of the World Trade Center on February 26, 1993. In addition, the denominator
is much smaller: according to the 2000 United States Census, there are 1,189,731 persons
living in the United States who have one or more Arab ancestors and approximately 10
percent of those (or about 120,000) are young men between the ages of 15 and 30. 43
Naturally, the appearance of being of Arab descent encompasses many more young men
of color, so the denominator is probably higher. But even if we assume that it is one
hundred or more times bigger, there is still an offending differential in the range of at
42
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least 1:100 for non-profiled versus profiled group members. It would be crucial to get a
better handle on this first quantity of interest—but there is, in all likelihood, a significant
offending differential.
I will incorporate here, for simplicity, one graph that visually explains the rational
choice argument. The graph shows the relationship between the internal rate of searches
conducted within each of the two groups and the offending rate of these different groups.
At Time 1, the counterterrorism agents are not engaged in profiling of any sort: the police
are searching both groups at the same internal search rate of 10 percent. The graph
reflects the basic assumption of non-spurious profiling, namely that young Muslim men
are offending at a slightly higher rate than white men and all women—let’s suppose 1.5
versus 1 per 100 million—resulting in higher successful search rates for the searches of
young Muslim men.
Given the higher marginal success rate for searches of young Muslim men, the
police may begin to search that group more than their share of the available population,
and, as the proportion of searches targeting young Muslim men increases, the offending
rate of that group decreases. This is the fundamental assumption of rational choice,
namely that as the cost of offending increases, the rate decreases. The police continue to
search marginally more young Muslim men until Time 2 when their offending rate is
equal to that of white men and women—1.3 per 100 million. Now the police are using the
profile in their decision to search: the police are searching about 18 percent of the
available young Muslim men and about 5 percent of the available white men and women,
resulting in a hypothetical total distribution of searches of, say, 60 percent young males
of color and 40 percent whites. At that distribution of searches, the offending rates are
similar—and, one can infer, so are the hit rates. At that distribution, the efficient police
officer has no reason to change the distribution of searches: the officer has no incentive to
search more young Muslim men than the 60/40 total distribution, which produces these
different internal group search rates. At Time 2, even though the police are not allocating
any more resources to the enterprise, the number of successful searches has increased and
the total societal level of offending has decreased from where it stood at Time 1. 44

44

This is a mathematical property of the model that I discuss in greater technical detail in Harcourt 2004
and 2006.

3/1/2006

Harcourt: Muslim Profiles

16

If the police are, in fact, searching more young Muslim men and getting to Time
3, where the offending rate of young Muslim men is lower than that of whites—1.3
versus 1.7 per 100 million—then the police must be bigoted: the only reason that a police
officer would search more young Muslim men than at the Time 2 equilibrium—that is,
would search, say, 80 percent young Muslim men and 20 percent whites, instead of the
Time 2 distribution of 60/40—is if the officer had a taste for discrimination resulting in
higher utility even though less young Muslim men are offending and thus less searches
are successful. 45
The three hypothetical distributions of searches between young Muslim men and
all others—at Times 1, 2, and 3—correspond to three different sets of internal group
search rates. These three scenarios also correspond to the three equilibrium points for the
color-blind, efficient, and bigoted policing. The three time points are represented in the
following graph:

45
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GRAPH: The Economic Model of Profiling
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In sum, the economic model suggests that profiling will increase the success rate
of police investigations and reduce the overall societal level of offending with the same
police resources. Naturally, additional judicial resources would be needed to process the
increased detection of terrorist activities, though one would expect that those costs would
be offset by the harm that would have been prevented.

B.

Elasticity Among the Non-Profiled and Possible Substitution Effects

According to the economic model, members of the profiled group are not the only
ones who will respond to the change in policing. Members of the non-profiled group are
also going to change their behavior as a result of the decreased cost of crime—but in
their case, by increasing their offending. So, for instance, if the United States taxing
authorities target drywall contractors and car dealers for audits of their tax returns—as
they did in the mid-1990s—we can expect that there will be less tax evasion by drywall
contractors and car dealers because their cost of tax evasion has increased. But at the
same time, we can expect that, say, accountants and bankers will realize that they are less
likely to be audited, and may therefore cheat a bit more on their taxes. Similarly, if the
highway patrol target African-American motorists for stops and searches—again, there is
evidence for this in several states—then we can expect African-American motorists to
respond by offending less. But by the same token, white motorists may begin to offend
more as they begin to feel increasingly immune from investigation and prosecution.
This is true in the terrorism context where we have witnessed similar substitution
effects. It happened in Israel, for instance, starting in 2002 when young girls and women
became suicide bombers. As Jonathan Tucker, a counterterrorism expert explains, “At
first, suicide terrorists [in Israel] were all religious, militant young men recruited from
Palestinian universities or mosques. In early 2002, however, the profile began to change
as secular Palestinians, women, and even teenage girls volunteered for suicide missions.
On March 29 2002, Ayat Akhars, an 18-year-old Palestinian girl from Bethlehem who
looked European and spoke Hebrew, blew herself up in a West Jerusalem supermarket,
killing two Israelis. Suicide bombers have also sought to foil profiling efforts by shaving
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their beards, dyeing their hair blond, and wearing Israeli uniforms or even the traditional
clothing of orthodox Jews.” 46
In this sense, the opponents of racial profiling are also correct—and, also, as a
matter of “statistical fact.” If we assume elasticity among rational actors, then profiling
will increase offending among member of the non-profiled group. This has led many
counterterrorism experts to question or deny outright the effectiveness of profiling. As
Bruce Hoffman suggests, “profiling of suicide bombers is no longer effective. Suicide
attacks can be young or old, male or female, religious or secular.” 47 It has led other
counterterrorism experts and practitioners—such as New York City police commissioner
Raymond Kelly—to avoid profiling on traits that can substitute easily. As Malcolm
Gladwell explains, “It doesn’t work to generalize about a relationship between a category
and a trait when that relationship isn’t stable—or when the act of generalizing may itself
change the basis of the generalization.” 48 To avoid these “unstable” traits, police chief
Kelly does not rely on race, but instead on traits like nervousness and inconsistency—
traits that are more permanently associated with criminal offending and that do not lend
themselves to substitution.

C.

The Central Theoretical Puzzle

The fact that there may be elasticity and thus substitution among the non-profiled,
however, does not end the debate. It does not mean that profiling is ineffective. Some
substitution is inevitable. The real question is, how much substitution can we expect and
will it outweigh the benefits of profiling? The central theoretical question is, in other
words, how do the elasticities of the two groups compare? How does the elasticity of the
profiled group compare to that of the non-profiled group?
The trouble with the economic model is that it assumes both groups are equally
elastic to policing. (This is reflected in the earlier graph by the parallel shape of the two
offending curves). But this assumes away the central theoretical question. What matters
46
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most for the effectiveness of racial profiling is precisely the comparative elasticity of the
two groups. If the targeted group members have lower elasticity of offending to
policing—if their offending is less responsive to policing than other groups—then
targeting them for enforcement efforts will increase the overall amount of crime in
society because the increase in crime by members of the non-profiled group will exceed
the decrease in crime by members of the profiled group. In raw numbers, the effect of the
profiling will be greater on the more elastic non-profiled group and smaller on the less
elastic profiled group.
Again, this is true as well in the terrorism context. The central question here is
how responsive young Muslim men are to policing and whether they are less elastic than
non-Muslim men and women. If they are less responsive overall, then targeted policing
may actually increase total incidents of terrorism by encouraging the non-profiled group
members to engage in terrorist acts—since the price to them has decreased. This would
enable terrorist organizations to recruit more heavily from outside the profiled group—
women, white men, and others who do not look like young Muslim men.
It is precisely the comparative elasticities of offending to policing that determines
whether and how much substitution there is between members of the profiled and nonprofiled groups. This is the central puzzle, but at this theoretical level, there is no good
reason to assume that the higher-offending group is as responsive or more responsive to
policing than members of the non-profiled groups. After all, we are assuming that the two
groups have different offending rates. Whether it is due to different socio-economic
backgrounds, to religious fanaticism, to education, culture, or upbringing, non-spurious
profiling rests on the non-spurious assumption that one group of individuals offends more
than the other, holding everything else constant. If their offending is different, then why
would their elasticity be the same? If members of the profiled group are offending more
because they are more religious, then might they also be less elastic to policing? There is
no a priori reason why the group that offends more should be more or as elastic than the
other.
The bottom line, then, is that if the profiled group has lower elasticity of offending
to policing, profiling that group will probably increase the amount of terrorism in the
long-term. I demonstrate this with mathematical equations in my article Rethinking
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Racial Profiling, but the proof is captured well and more simply by modifying the earlier
graph to reflect different elasticities:

GRAPH: A Model of Profiling with Different Elasticities
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In essence, as long as the equilibrium point in offending at Time 2 is achieved above the
average offending rate at Time 1, the profiling will produce increased crime in society.
In the terrorism context, the elasticity of offending represents only one form of
possible substitution. There are others that can also result in an increased long-term rate
of attacks, including, for instance, the use of different terrorist modes of attack that would
be less susceptible to detection by profiling. The central empirical questions, then, are (1)
whether and to what extent the group of profiled individuals (Arab-looking young males)
are elastic to policing; (2) whether and to what extent the group of non-profiled
individuals (non-Arab looking young men and all other men and women) are elastic to
policing; (3) more importantly, how those elasticities compare; and (4) whether there are
different forms of substitution that might also occur.

E.

Empirical Research on Counterterrorism Measures

On these central questions, there is no reliable empirical evidence. There is no
empirical research on elasticities—absolute or comparative—nor on substitution effects
in the racial profiling context. The only forms of substitution that have been studied
empirically in the counterterrorism context involve substitution as between different
methods of attack and intertemporal substitution.
Rigorous empirical research in the terrorism context traces to a 1978 paper by my
colleague at the University of Chicago, William Landes, that explores the effect of
installing metal detectors in airports on the incidence of aircraft hijackings. 49 Extending
the rational choice framework to terrorist activities, Landes developed an economic
model to test whether mandatory screening reduced the likelihood of a terrorist hijacking.
Using a dataset of United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records of
aircraft hijackings from 1961 to 1976, Landes analyzed the time interval between
hijackings to measure the frequency of these events. Landes found that “increases in the
probability of apprehension, the conditional probability of incarceration, and the sentence
are associated with significant reductions in aircraft hijackings in the 1961-to-1976 time
49
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period,” 50 and he estimates that between 41 and 67 fewer aircraft hijackings occurred on
planes departing from the United States following mandatory screening and the
installation of metal detectors in U.S. airports. 51
In his 1978 study, Landes used sophisticated quantitative analyses to regress the
quarterly totals of aircraft hijackings, as well as time and flight intervals between
successive hijackings, on the probability of apprehension. The effect, though, can be
visualized here based on data from the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database
Project. 52 This graph charts both the number of aircraft hijackings between 1968 and
1980, as well as the proportion of terrorist acts that consisted of hijackings:
U.S. Aircraft Hijackings, 1961-1976
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Landes 1978: 28.
Landes 1978:28-29. Landes also found that the cost of mandatory screening of all passengers was
“enormous”: The estimated net increase in security costs due to the screening program (which does not
include the time and inconvenience costs to person searched) . . . translates into a $3.24-to-$9.25 million
expenditure to deter a single hijacking. Put differently, if the dollar equivalent to the loss to an individual
hijacked passenger were in the range of $76,718 to $219,221, then the costs of screening would just offset
the expected hijacking losses” (Landes 1978: 29).
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The graph clearly demonstrates that mandatory screening and the installation of
metal detectors in 1973 coincided with a significant drop in both the absolute number and
the proportion of international terrorist acts represented by hijackings. Landes’ research
suggests that the terrorist’s decision whether to engage in a terrorist act is a function of
the probability and expected utility of different possible outcomes.
Subsequent research built on Landes’ framework to explore possible substitution
effects. In their 1988 article Intervention Policy Analysis of Skyjackings and Other
Terrorist Incidents, Jon Cauley and Eric Im used interrupted time series analysis to
explore the impact of the installation of metal detectors on different types of terrorist
attacks. They found that, although the implementation resulted in a permanent decrease in
the number of hijackings, it produced a proportionally larger increase in other types of
terrorist attacks. 53 In their 1993 article on The Effectiveness of Antiterrorism Policies,
Walter Enders and Todd Sandler also revisit mandatory screening, and similarly show
that, although mandatory screening coincided with a sharp decrease in hijackings, it also
coincided with increased assassinations and other kinds of hostage attacks, including
barricade missions and kidnappings. 54 The introduction of metal detectors, they show,
resulted in a steady increase in other kinds of hostage events—consistent with the idea
that “terrorist groups substituted away from skyjackings and complementary events
involving protected persons and into other kinds of hostage incidents.” 55
These researchers have also looked at other forms of substitution. Retaliatory
strikes, like the United States strike on Libya on April 15, 1986, resulted in “increased
bombings and related incidents;” 56 but they tended to level off later. As Enders and
Sandler explain, “The evidence seems to be that retaliatory raids induce terrorists to
intertemporally substitute attacks planned for the future into the present to protest the
retaliation. Within a relatively few quarters, terrorist attacks resumed the same mean
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number of events.” 57 Enders and Sandler also found that the fortification of U.S.
embassies and missions in October of 1976 resulted in a reduction of terrorist attacks
against U.S. interests, but produced a substitution toward assassinations. 58 Cauley and Im
(1988) also analyze the effect of target hardening of U.S. embassies and find that they
had an “abrupt but transitory influence on the number of barricade and hostage taking
events.” 59 Their conclusion is that “the unintended consequences of an antiterrorism
policy may be far more costly than intended consequences, and must be anticipated.” 60
But that’s all the solid empirical evidence. The most recent and thorough review
of the empirical literature, based on a Campbell Collaborative protocol, identified only
seven rigorous empirical studies: “In the course of our review, we discovered that there is
an almost complete absence of evaluation research on counter-terrorism strategies. From
over 20,000 studies we located on terrorism, we found only seven which contained
moderately rigorous evaluations of counter-terrorism programs. We conclude that there is
little scientific knowledge about the effectiveness of most counter-terrorism
interventions.” 61
Moreover, there are no empirical studies on racial profiling in the terrorism
context. I found only one article, and it is theoretical, not empirical. 62 Concerned that this
may have been an artifact of a U.S.-bias, I contacted Dr. Ganor Boaz (a leading
researcher on terrorism in Israel) at the Institute for Counter-Terrorism at the
Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya (a leading research center on terrorism in Israel), and
57

Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, “What Do We Know About the Substitution Effect In Transnational
Terrorism?” in Researching Terrorism: Trends, Achievements, Failures, eds. A. Silke and G. Ilardi
(London: Frank Cass) (available as April 2002 paper at
http://www.rcf.usc.edu/~tsandler/substitution2ms.pdf) at page *16.
58
Enders and Sandler 1993: 842.
59
Cauley and Im 1988: 30.
60
Enders and Sandler 1993: 843. These substitution effects can also be aggravated by innovation effects—
which include new modes of attack and new techniques and weapons. Enders and Sandler explain that, “In
the long term, terrorists will develop ingenious countermeasures to circumvent the technology.
Immediately after airport vigilance was increased as a result of 9/11, Richard Reid (aka Tariq Rajah) was
discovered on a flight from Paris to the United States with an explosive device in his shoes. Now that
airport security routinely inspects shoes, plastic guns, electronic jamming equipment, bottles of flammable
liquid or other explosive devices are predicted to be hidden on (or in) the terrorist or in carry-on luggage.
Thus, there are dynamic strategic interactions; authorities must be vigilant to improve technology by
anticipating ways of circumventing current technological barriers. This vigilance must lead to periodic
upgrades in the technology prior to the terrorists exposing the technology’s weakness through a successful
attack.” Enders and Sandler 2002/4 at *18.
61
Lum, Kennedy, and Sherley 2006 at 3.
62
Yetman 2004.

3/1/2006

Harcourt: Muslim Profiles

26

asked him if there were any empirical studies on profiling in Israel. His response: no. He
is unaware of “any empirical research that has been done in Israel on the efficiency of
profiling.” 63 The reason, in large part, is that ethnic appearance is a poor indicator of
terrorism in Israel. As Dr. Ganor explains, “There were many cases of public and security
awareness that prevented or limited terrorist attacks in Israel based on the looks of the
suspect but it is sometimes difficult to define if this practice was based on national
identity, ethnic profile or suspicious behavior, or all of the above together.” 64

F.

Some Loose Ends

Naturally, there are a lot of other unanswered questions. First, in all likelihood
terrorist organizations are already recruiting outside the profiled group regardless of
whether the NYPD is engaged in racial profiling. What difference, then, would racial
profiling make? Does the incremental cost of profiling in the subways really change the
equation? And how sensitive are terrorists to such an incremental cost?
Second, the decision to have police officers search bags and monitor subway
entrances—regardless of whether they profile—already increases the cost of such an
attack. What is the incremental difference achieved by racial profiling and will it have
any effect on behavior?
Third, even if there is more substitution, might it lead to less harmful attacks? As
Enders and Sandler suggest, “Even some piecemeal policies that cause substitutions by
focusing on only part of the overall terrorism problem may have some net positive
impacts. To the extent that the National Defense Authorization Act leads to a reduction in
the likelihood of biological terrorism, substitutions into other attack modes will occur.
The desirability of such policies is that they may force terrorists to substitute into less
harmful events. Anti-terrorist policies can be most effective when the government
simultaneously targets a wide range of terrorist attack modes, so that the overall rise in
the prices of terrorist attacks becomes analogous to a decrease in resources.” 65
Fourth, might racial profiling itself affect comparative elasticities? Is it possible
that racial profiling might soften the elasticity of the non-profiled group, or harden that of
63
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the profiled group, by reinforcing a perception that the United States and European
countries are anti-Muslim? There is good reason to believe, for instance, that the torture
at Abu-Ghraib in 2004 may serve as a future recruitment tool for terrorist organizations.
As Anderton and Carter suggest, “It is likely that the degrading images of Iraqi prisoners
hardened the preferences of terrorists against the United States. It may have also created
terrorist preferences among some individuals who previously had flat indifference curves
[as to terrorist activities]. Hence, the prisoner abuse scandal can be seen as a form of
‘negative advertising’ that may have reshaped terrorist preferences toward more
terrorism.” 66 In the same way, might the profiling of young Muslim men in New York
City serve as a form of “negative advertising” that may undermine efforts to eradicate
terrorism?
Finally, might racial profiling produce a loss of political legitimacy at home or
abroad, possibly increasing the responsiveness of non-profiled group members to
recruitment efforts? The perception that our counterterrorism measures are illegitimate
may affect obedience to the law. Psychologist Tom Tyler has demonstrated how
perceptions of the legitimacy of criminal justice procedures affect the willingness of
citizens to abide by the law. Tyler’s book Why People Obey the Law (1990), and his
writings on procedural fairness and institutional legitimacy, including his essay Trust and
Democratic Governance (1998), rest precisely on the idea that individuals derive a strong
sense of identity from their relationship with legal authority. When the relationship is
positive and respectful, a form of social trust—a concept closely linked to the idea of
social capital made popular in Robert Putnam’s book, Bowling Alone—develops and
promotes obedience to the law. “[S]ocial trust,” Tyler contends, “is linked to creating a
commitment and loyalty to the group and to group rules and institutions.” 67 This
commitment and loyalty to the group translates into greater obedience to the law. When
this loyalty is undermined, so too is obedience to the law. Will this affect the
responsiveness of members of non-profiled groups?
These are all fascinating questions, but all relatively minor compared to the
central question: whether racial profiling of young Muslim men in the New York
66
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subways will likely detect a terrorist attack or instead lead to the recruitment of nonprofiled persons and the substitution of other acts for subway attacks—in other words,
whether profiling will detect or increase terrorist attacks. The answer to this question is
pure speculation. In the end, then, there is no need or reason to engage in a rights tradeoff.
CONCLUSION
There is a lesson here. Defensive counterterrorism measures need to be evaluated
closely. As Enders, Sandler, Faria, Tucker, and other counterterrorist experts emphasize,
measures that raise the price of one and only one specific activity, such as airplane
hijackings, are likely to produce troubling substitution effects; measures that raise the
price of all terrorist acts or conversely reduce the resources of terrorists are less
problematic and less likely to produce unanticipated substitution. 68 The optimal strategy
to combat terrorism is to reduce terrorist resources across the board. It is for this reason
that intelligence and proactive counterterrorism operations are generally viewed as a
priority. As General Meir Dagan, former head of the Bureau for Counterterrorism in the
Israeli prime minister’s office, explains, “Investments in intelligence are invisible,
whereas increased security is visible but often wasteful. The first priority must be placed
on intelligence, then on counterterrorism operations, and finally on defense and
protection.” 69
Racial profiling as a defensive counterterrorism measure is suspect for precisely
this reason: it may well encourage the recruitment of terrorists from outside the core
profile and the substitution of other terrorist acts. Does this mean that the New York City
police department should not harden targets like the subway system—targets that are
attractive to terrorists because of the number of potential victims? No. It is probably
better to divert terrorist attacks away from large groups of people, wherever and
whenever possible. But it does mean that the police should harden those types of targets
without deploying a racial profile. There is no point triggering the potential substitution
effects associated with racial profiling.
68

Enders and Sandler 2002/4 at *10; Faria 2006; Tucker 2003.
Tucker 2003: *2. Walter Enders and Todd Sandler seem to agree: “Governments must act to reduce the
terrorists’ resource endowments (i.e., their finances, leadership, and membership) if an overall decrease in
terrorism is to follow. Efforts to infiltrate and undermine terrorist groups and to freeze their assets have the
consequence of reducing the overall amount of terrorism.” Enders and Sandler 2002/4 at *17.
69
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